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Morocco is in the process of formulating a rural development strategy aimed at
generating rapid and efficient income growth in rural areas with positive repercussions in
the rest of the economy. In this study, an economywide model focused on Morocco’s
rural economy is used as a laboratory for analyzing issues at the core of such a rural
development strategy. The features of the model are summarized in a separate box at the
end of this summary. The base-run solutions for 1994 and 2000 are calibrated to replicate
simulation results for a basic reform scenario generated by the RMSM (Revised
Minimum Standard Model) of the World Bank. This scenario incorporates the
implementation of a basic reform program including a smaller government, increased
government savings and  reduced micro-level price distortions (reduced non-tariff barriers
and partial unification of the rates for indirect taxes and import tariffs), paving the way
for a higher GDP share allocated to investment. The model is used to explore the effects
of alternative scenarios for water tariffs and sales, and supply-side advances (irrigation
expansion, and accelerated productivity growth, both in agriculture and other sectors).
Among these, instruments of tax policy and irrigation expansion are under the direct
control of policymakers whereas other supply-side shifts are less directly influenced by
government actions. 
In the base scenario, the major macro aggregates closely replicate the World Bank
RMSM simulation (including growth in real GDP at an annual rate of 3.1%), involves
slower growth in agriculture (especially for cereals-legumes and livestock products) than
in other sectors, primarily the result of reduced border protection. While average
household per-capita incomes increase by 10% between 1994 and 2000, income growth is
slower in rural areas, especially for farm households, who depend on returns from water
and land for the bulk of their incomes. These  results reinforce the need to develop a
strategy for rural development that speeds up rural income growth and generates positive
economywide repercussions.In Morocco, irrigation water is subsidized for farmers in large-scale irrigation (LSI)
schemes, covering slightly less than half of the permanently irrigated area. Such subsidies
lack social justification (as a group, the farmers who benefit from the subsidy are not less
well off than others), and absorb resources that more fruitfully could be allocated to other
purposes (for example adding to government savings and/or to government spending in
areas of higher social priority). Model simulations confirm that, while the imposition of a
higher water tariff has the drawback of hurting LSI farm households, it has the advantage
of improving the government’s fiscal position. If  the water tariff hike is combined with
farmer water sales, the impact on these farmers is cushioned while significant quantities
of water are liberated for use elsewhere in the economy. In addition to paving the way for
a more efficient sectoral allocation of water (inside agriculture and between agriculture
and other sectors), such water sales may also encourage water-saving technical change
based on investments financed by the farmers themselves.
The national plan for irrigation expansion, including proportional increases in
irrigated areas and water supply, has a positive impact on macro indicators and household
incomes, especially for the rainfed farm households who own the land that is converted
from rainfed to irrigated. However, the program has a negative impact on existing
irrigated farm households (who initially control all irrigated land and water resources)
since they face declining land and water rents. The benefits of the program may be
measured by the increase in real factor incomes that it brings about. Benefit-cost analysis,
drawing on this information and separate cost data,  suggests that internal rate of return of
the program (the discount rate at which the net present value is zero) is around 8-10%,
i.e., a fairly moderate rate of return. Whether irrigation expansion should be undertaken
or not depends not only on the rate of return for the program; it is also influenced by the
returns to competing alternative projects. 
Productivity growth is crucial for raising growth in production and incomes. A set
of simulations explores the impact of accelerated growth in total factor productivity for
different agricultural subsectors, for aggregate sectors (agricultural, rural non-agricultural,
and urban), and for the economy as a whole. The effects are uniformly positive, both interms of macro indicators (including GDP growth and employment generation) and
household incomes. The gains are shared widely in the sense that no household group
loses in absolute terms. However, in relative terms, urban households gain the most
because they derive the bulk of their incomes from factors that are intensively used in
dynamic sectors facing high income and price elasticities of demand. The only exception
to this anti-rural distribution of gains is the case of accelerated productivity growth for
non-agricultural rural activities, primarily producing non-tradable commodities, where the
rural households gain more than their urban counterparts. This distributional effect stems
from the fact that these commodities, whose relative prices decline, primarily are
demanded by households and producers in rural areas. Given the aims of a rural
development strategy, rural non-agriculture is a high-priority area for productivity-raising
efforts.
In a final set of simulations, the model is used to explore win-win scenarios that
combine elements of the above simulations — more rapid productivity growth in rural
(agricultural and non-agricultural) activities, higher water tariffs, and water sales — with
improved penetration of export markets for fruits and vegetables. The results demonstrate
that, under realistic assumptions, it is possible to design a policy package and resulting
development path that combine rapid and efficient growth in incomes and production
throughout the economy with an improved relative position for the rural population.SUMMARY OF MODEL FEATURES
The analysis of this paper uses an economywide agriculture-focused model of
Morocco which has been designed for analysis of rural development issues. The model
emphasizes agriculture, rural non-agricultural production, and sectors with strong links to
agriculture (supplying inputs or processing outputs). The model is closed by an aggregate
representation of urban activities, capturing economy-wide issues.
The model has a detailed treatment of agriculture, including 33 activities in crop
and livestock production. Activities, which may yield multiple outputs,  are disaggregated
into irrigated and rainfed, differing in their techniques (yields and mixture of factors and
other inputs). The model captures the structure of input-output links in the economy;
inside agriculture, this includes links between crop and livestock production (for example
the use of  manure as input in crop production). 
The factors of production are divided into capital, labor (urban and rural), and
agricultural resources (rainfed land, irrigated land, water, and pasture land).  Producers
maximize profits subject to production functions with neoclassical substitutability for
factors and fixed coefficients for most intermediate inputs. Households (a total of five
groups, including three in agriculture — irrigated and rainfed farmers, and rural workers)
receive the bulk of their incomes from the factors they control, including worker
remittances from abroad, and use their income to save and consume (according to
demand functions derived from utility maximization). 
Flexible prices clear most markets; the main exception is labor for which
unemployment at a fixed real wage is possible. Given the medium-run time frame of the
analysis, both capital and labor can migrate between sectors and rural-urban areas.
Outputs that are sold domestically and traded internationally are imperfect substitutes.
The same assumption is made for agricultural outputs from irrigated and rainfed zones.
The macro rules of the model are simple: government savings is a residual; a flexible real
exchange rate equilibrates the fixed current account deficit; and adjustments in the urban
household savings rate assure that aggregate investment, a fixed share of GDP, is fully
financed.
The model, which is solved in a comparative static mode,  provides a simulation
laboratory for doing controlled experiments, changing policies and other exogenous
conditions, and measuring the impact of these changes. Each solution provides a full set
of economic indicators, including household incomes; prices, supplies and demands for
factors and commodities (including foreign trade for the latter); and macroeconomic data. The authors would like to thank Moataz el-Said for invaluable research assistance.
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Morocco is in the process of formulating a rural development strategy aimed at
accelerated growth and poverty alleviation in the context of a transition toward a more
open and liberal economy. For the agricultural sector, this involves, inter alia, using taxes,
subsidies, and other policy tools with the aim of raising the efficiency of resource
utilization, supporting productivity-raising investments, and generating higher incomes
from employment and other sources.
The model of this paper, which is disaggregated so as to capture key aspects of the
economic structure of rural Morocco, provides a laboratory for doing controlled
experiments, changing policies and other exogenous conditions, and measuring the
impact of these changes. It is here used to analyze issues related to water tariffs and
agricultural water sales to urban households, irrigation expansion, and productivity
growth (both in agriculture and other sectors). We start with an overview of the model
structure and the data base  (Section 2). Section 3 presents the simulations and analyzes
the results; Section 4 synthesizes the main conclusions. The paper includes an appendix
presenting tables with supplementary simulation results and other data underlying the
analysis.The rich tradition of economywide models of Morocco is exemplified by Mateus
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et al. (1988), Morrisson (1991), Rutherford et al. (1993), Serghini (1993), Roland-Holst
and van der Mensbrugghe (1994), and Goldin and Roland-Holst (1995).
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2. MODEL STRUCTURE AND DATA SOURCES
We will here present the rural-economy model and its data sources. The current
model, which draws on existing economy-wide models of Morocco, is distinguished by a
detailed treatment of agriculture, which is disaggregated into rainfed and irrigated areas.
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As opposed to previous models,  it is solved as a mixed-complementarity problem; this
permits excess supplies (unemployment) of agricultural resources and labor, an important
feature rarely found in economywide models (but common in agricultural sector models).
Outside agriculture, the treatment is more detailed for sectors with strong links to
agriculture or rural households. To avoid the fallacy of viewing the rural economy as an
isolated island, the model is closed by adding an aggregate representation of urban
activities. The latter addition is extremely important since rural households and activities,
though linkages via output supplies, consumption and input demands, and labor
migration, both influence and are influenced by changes in the urban economy. The
following presentation of model is divided into four sections, covering its structure (its
treatment of factors, activities and commodities, and institutions) and data sources.
2.1. FACTORS
Table 2.1.1 shows the disaggregation of factors, institutions, activities, and inputs.
The model includes ten factor types, eight of which are rural. In terms of the broader
categories, labor and capital are used by all activities whereas resources are only used by
agriculture. Given the medium-term time frame of the analysis, it is also assumed that
each capital type is freely mobile across sectors. Each resource is allocated across the For water, this is the part of the rent kept by the farmers. In addition, there is a
3
fixed (subsidized) charge per unit of water used.
Full employment is defined as a 5% unemployment rate.
4
4
activities demanding it — irrigated crop activities for irrigated land and water; rainfed
crop activities for rainfed land; and livestock activities for pasture — so as to equate its
marginal value in each activity with the rent. For all resources except water, full
utilization and a flexible market-clearing rent is assumed. For water, the option of excess
supply in combination with a zero rent has been added.  
3
The treatment of rural and urban labor captures the phenomena of migration, 
sectoral wage differences, (potential) unemployment, and downward wage rigidity.
Wages are differentiated across the demanding sectors on the basis of fixed ratios
(calculated from base-year data); the wage differences are a reflection of existing
distortions and other real-world phenomena whose causes are not modeled explicitly.
Workers (but not the households to which the workers belong) are freely mobile, not only
within each region, but also, via migration, between rural and urban regions. In the rural
labor market, full employment and a flexible average wage are assumed. In the urban
labor market, the average wage is fixed at a minimum level if there is less than full
employment; if full employment is reached, the wage is flexible upwards.  Labor
4
migration (in either direction) assures that the ratio between the average rural and urban
wages is fixed. 
In practice, this labor market treatment means that, if urban employment is less
than full, urban and rural wages are fixed. In this case, upward pressure on the rural wage
produces urban-to-rural migration; downward pressure on the rural wage produces
rural-to-urban migration. If urban employment is at the full employment level, both urban
and rural wages are flexible; migration will assure that the ratio between the averages
remains unchanged. The resulting relatively high degree of mobility in the labor market is5
appropriate given the medium-term perspective of this paper — adjustments are assumed
to take place during a six-year period.
2.2. ACTIVITIES AND COMMODITIES
The model covers 42 production activities, including 33 in agriculture (cf. Table
2.1.1). The criteria used for determining whether a crop activity is singled out are area
share (crops occupying more than 5% in the relevant region are included) and policy
relevance: is the crop directly affected by a specific policy intervention? The model also
covers the main livestock activities. In order to capture multiplier effects inside the rural
economy (not only consisting of agriculture), a rural service sector has been
distinguished; its non-tradable output is sold to agricultural activities, rural households,
and as an intermediate input to the rural service sector itself. Other sectors with strong
links to agriculture have been singled out: fertilizers/pesticides and energy (for backward
linkages, as well as food processing and sugar processing (for forward linkages). A public
administration activity, which is highly labor intensive and financed by the government,
is included to permit the simulation of the policy lever of public sector employment.
Finally, the model is closed by adding one aggregate urban sector representing the rest of
the economy. 
Outside the agricultural sector, the commodity disaggregation is very closely linked
to the activity disaggregation since most activities yield only one output. Inside
agriculture, however, most activities yield multiple outputs, for crops typically a major
product (for example grain) and a byproduct used as animal feed. For livestock activities,
the most important outputs are meat, milk, and manure. The outputs of activities that
appear in more than one region (for example soft wheat and vegetables), are assumed to
be imperfect substitutes. Agricultural input demands are aggregated to match the
commodity categories in the rest of the model.With fixed input coefficients, livestock production in rainfed areas would,
5
unrealistically, be in direct proportion to the area of pastureland. Similarly, vegetable
activities would be rigidly linked to the availability of manure, an input they use
intensively. 
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2.3. PRODUCER BEHAVIOR AND TECHNOLOGY
Table 2.3.1 summarizes basic model assumptions. Producers in all activities
maximize profits subject to their technologies. For all sectors, the technology is specified
by a nested neoclassical (Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution or CES) value-added
function (with the relevant factors as arguments), and fixed (Leontief) intermediate input
coefficients. There are some exceptions to the assumption of fixed intermediated input
coefficients: for livestock, (food and sugar) processing, and vegetable activities, these
coefficients are flexible for selected inputs in the context of producer minimization of
input costs subject to a limited degree of substitutability between different inputs (given
by a CES function) and a fixed aggregate input requirement per unit of each activity. The
purpose behind this formulation is to permit more flexibility in terms of input mix as
relative prices of inputs from agriculture change.
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2.4. INSTITUTIONS
On the institutional side, the model includes households, government, and the rest
of the world. Domestic factor incomes are split among the domestic institutions in fixed
shares. The disaggregation of households closely follows the factor disaggregation, i.e.,
the households are largely extensions of the functional factor distribution.
In addition to factor (capital) incomes, government revenue consists of indirect
domestic taxes, tariffs, and transfers from the households. All taxes are ad valorem
whereas household transfers are expressed as fixed income shares. The government Basic issues related to tradable water rights are discussed in Rosegrant and
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Binswanger (1994). Rosegrant and Gazmuri (1995) draw lessons for developing countries
from case studies of tradable water rights in Chile, Mexico and California.
The model uses the Stone-Geary utility function, which yields a set of LES (Linear
7
Expenditure System) functions. For details, see Dervis et al. (1982, pp. 482-485).
8
allocates this income to transfers to households (a fixed share of GDP) and the rest of the
world (fixed in foreign currency), consumption (also a fixed GDP share), ad valorem
subsidies, and savings.
Among households, farmers receive the bulk of their incomes from agricultural
resources, crop capital, and rural labor. The fact that, if water is scarce, its income (like
land incomes) accrues to the irrigated farm households, is compatible with the
assumption that proprietary rights to water have been assigned to the current users.  The
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rural worker households live off labor incomes while the incomes of the other rural
households primarily come from capital. The incomes of the urban households are mainly
from capital and labor. Factor incomes are complemented by transfers from the
government and the rest of the world (fixed in foreign currency). On the spending side,
household incomes are used for savings (according to exogenous saving propensities for
all but one; cf. later discussion of rules for achieving balance between savings and
investment) and consumption. Consumption demands (in per-capita form) are derived
from maximization of a standard neoclassical utility function.
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The rest of the world supplies imports and demands exports. Given Morocco’s
small foreign market shares, import and export prices are exogenous in foreign currency
(i.e., import supply and export demands are infinitely elastic at given prices). Domestic
prices of commodities and domestic outputs and all flexible, varying to clear relevant
markets in a competitive setting where both suppliers and demanders are price-takers.
The prices include relevant policy wedges such as tariffs and subsidies. Compared to multimarket and agricultural sector programming models, which 
8
assume perfect substitutability for all outputs, the inclusion of the option of imperfect
substitutability is an improvement, associated with the CGE literature.
9
For any commodity, it is assumed that there are quality differences between
exports, imports, and domestic output sold domestically, as well as between the outputs
of different domestic activities (to the extent that more than one activity exists in the
sector — this only applies to a subset of the agricultural activities, for example vegetables
produced both in the irrigated and rainfed sectors).  The assumption of quality differences
8
is crucial: it grants the domestic price system a degree of independence from international
prices, permits regional (irrigated vs. rainfed) price differences, and dampens foreign
trade and domestic production responses to changes in the producer environment. 
More technically, the Armington assumption is used to model the choice between
imports and domestic output. This means that, to the extent that a commodity is imported,
all domestic demands are for a composite commodity made up of imports and domestic
output, with the mix between the two determined by the assumption that domestic
demanders minimize cost subject to imperfect substitutability, captured by a CES
aggregation function. The same functional form is also used to model imperfect
substitutability between different domestic suppliers of the same commodity; this
treatment is relevant for several agricultural commodities. For exported commodities, the
allocation of domestic output between exports and domestic sales is determined on the
assumption that domestic producers maximize profits subject to imperfect
transformability between these two alternatives, expressed by a Constant-Elasticity-of-
Transformation (CET) function.
The macro system constraints (or macro closures) determine the manner in which
the accounts for the government, the rest of the world, and savings-investment are
brought into balance. Government savings is the flexible residual  that clears the
government account; i.e., the rules for government spending and revenue collection areSavings from the other sources —government, other households, and the rest of
9
the world— are not free to equilibrate aggregate savings-investment: government and
rest-of-the-world savings perform the task of clearing their respective balances while the
savings rates for other households are a fixed share of income.
The Moroccan government sources include MAMVA (DPAE/Division des
10
Statistiques and DPV, AGER, DPA, and ORMVA), Ministère des Incitations à
l’Economie (Direction de la Statistique), Ministère des Finances, Ministère de l’Industrie,
Ministère des Travaux Publics, and Caisse de Compensation.
10
not adjusted to generate a predetermined level of government savings. For the rest-of-the-
world account, an endogenous exchange rate validates a current account deficit (foreign
savings), that is fixed in foreign currency; to avoid a deficit that is larger (smaller) than
the fixed level, the exchange rate will depreciate (appreciate). On the spending side of the
savings-investment balance, investment demand is a fixed GDP share; this amounts to
assuming either that investment decisions are invariant to the simulations that are carried
out or, alternatively, that the government uses policy instruments (including public-sector
investments) to generate the target investment level. On the savings side, the urban
household savings rate is flexible, varying to generate the level of total savings that is
needed to finance aggregate investment.  
9
2.5. DATA SOURCES AND APPROACH TO MODEL SOLUTION
The data base draws on (i) disaggregated agricultural information from the
Moroccan government, the World Bank, and the FAO, primarily for 1990/91;  (ii) a
10
disaggregated economywide framework represented by Social Accounting Matrices
(SAMs) for 1990 and 1994, an input-output table for 1990, as well as data on the 1994
policy regime — taxes, subsidies, and non-tariff barriers  (Bussolo and Roland-Holst,
1993; Roland-Holst, 1996a); and (iii) 1994 macro data from the World Bank RMSM
(Revised Minimum Standard Model) (Soman, 1996). An adjusted version of the RAS-For GAMS, see Brooke et al. (1988). Rutherford (1995) provides more
11
information on PATH and MILES. The agriculture-focused CGE model of Egypt in
Löfgren et al. (1996) is solved as an MCP problem. 
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Entropy program for SAM balancing was used to generate a disaggregated SAM for 1994
that replicates observed aggregates for the agricultural sector and on the macro level (see
Golan et al., 1994) and incorporates the disaggregation of factors, institutions, activities,
and commodities that is required for the current model structure. A macro version of this
SAM is displayed as Table 2.5.1.
Most model parameters are derived from this SAM. Elasticities for the functions
used — Armington, CET, CES (for production), and LES (linear expenditure system; for 
household demand) — are based on data available from other studies on Morocco (Aloui
et al,. 1989; de Janvry et al., 1992; Goldin and Roland-Holst, 1995; Laraki, 1989, Mateus
et al.,1988; Morrisson, 1991; and Rutherford et al., 1993).
The current model is solved as a mixed-complementarity problem (MCP),
consisting of a set of simultaneous equations that are a mix of strict equalities and
inequalities but without an objective function. This approach, made feasible by the recent
development of solvers, makes it possible to formulate a model that combines desired
features of mathematical programming models (in particular by permitting excess
supplies of agricultural resources, such as water) while permitting the full range of
assumptions for consumer demand, government policies, and foreign trade that appear in
multimarket and CGE models. The GAMS modeling software is used both to generate the
database and to implement the model. The model is solved with PATH and MILES, two
solvers for mixed complementarity problems.
11The Appendix includes disaggregated simulation data on foreign trade, resource
12
allocation, GDP growth, and policy parameters for 1994 and 2000 (rates for import
tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and indirect taxes).
The rate of TFP growth was slightly negative, -0.41% per year, a plausible
13
number given a moderate GDP growth rate and large annual variations, driven by a severe




The model was initially solved for 1994 and 2000; for the latter year, the results
capture the outcome of  a reform scenario according to the RMSM (Revised Minimum
Standard Model) of the World Bank (Soman, 1996). The projected path assumes the
implementation of a basic reform program including a smaller government, increased
government savings and  reduced micro-level price distortions, paving the way for a
higher GDP share allocated to investment and creating a more open economy with
exports and imports representing larger GDP shares. On the micro-level, the rates of non-
tariff barriers are cut in half and indirect taxes and import tariffs are partially unified: for
each tax and tariff rate, half of the gap between its 1994 level and the corresponding 1994
average rate was removed. (The rates are displayed in Tables A.6-8.)
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Macro results for 1994 and 2000 with the RMSM and our model are displayed in
Table 3.1.1. As shown, our model closely replicates the RMSM results. Total factor
productivity (TFP) was calibrated to generate the target level of real GDP.  For
13
investment, government spending and revenue items, parameter values were specified so
as to bring the simulated results very close to the RMSM path. In the labor market,
however, endogenous adjustments generated a decline in urban unemployment to 16.9%
instead of remaining around 20% according to the RMSM. Soft-wheat and sun-flower activities shrink drastically (by 10-15% per year),
14
while all sugar activities (irrigated and rainfed sugar beet, irrigated sugar cane, and sugar
processing) decline at a more moderate pace (2-3% per year). Growth in the other animal
activity (including poultry) is stronger, among other things because of a  much smaller
trade share.
15
Table 3.1.2 shows additional information for the 1994 and 2000 model solutions.
Aggregate GDP at market prices grows at an annual rate of 3.1%  Agriculture (both the
irrigated and rainfed subsectors) grows more slowly than other parts of the economy as a
result of the policy changes, significantly reducing tariff and non-tariff protection for
agriculture, especially for wheat, livestock and sugar sectors, with a strong negative
impact on sectors with large trade shares.  This leads to negative growth for cereals-
14
legumes (especially in irrigated areas where soft wheat dominates) and livestock
production (with a more strong decline for irrigated areas due to the small role of the non-
traded sheep-goat sector). Vegetable and fruit production (more important in irrigated
agriculture) grows rapidly in both irrigated and rainfed areas as resources are reallocated
in their favor. 
On the factor level, income growth is slow for the major immobile agricultural
factors (water, and irrigated and rainfed land). Due to its strong link to the sheep-goat
sector, the return to pasture land grows at a more rapid pace. On average, per-capita
household incomes go up by 10% between 1994 and 2000. However, incomes are
stagnant for farm households (who depend strongly on land and water incomes) while
more rapid growth is enjoyed by other households, both urban and rural, whose incomes
stem from mobile capital and labor. A depreciation of the real (CPI-indexed) exchange
rate is required to maintain the fixed trade deficit as border protection is reduced.
The BASE simulation shows that average income growth is slower in rural areas
where incomes initially are lower than elsewhere. Against this background, the followingORMVAs (Offices Régionaux de Mise en Valeur Agricole) are regional
15
agricultural development authorities in charge of part of the country's irrigated areas
(large-scale schemes and others) and adjacent rainfed lands.
17
 simulations examine a strategy aimed at speeding up rural income growth. They cover
exogenous changes in three areas: water (tariffs and sales to urban areas), irrigation
expansion, and accelerated productivity growth. To the extent that these changes require
additional government resources, it is assumed that the cost either is part of projected
government spending or can be covered by reallocating government resources from
unproductive uses without any broader economic effects. For the simulations that follow,
the results for the BASE scenario provide the benchmark for comparisons.
3.2. WATER: TARIFFS AND SALES TO URBAN AREAS
In Morocco, the provision of irrigation water is subsidized for farmers in areas
belonging to large-scale irrigation (LSI) schemes operated by ORMVAs,  representing
15
around 47% of the area under permanent irrigation and 7% of the total cultivated area
(see Table A.11 for disaggregated data on cultivated areas). Such subsidies lack social
justification (as a group, farmers in large-scale irrigation schemes are not less well of than
others), and absorb resources that more fruitfully could be allocated to other purposes (for
example adding to government savings and domestic investment and/or to government
spending in areas of higher social priority). The subsidy may be defined as the difference
between the charge (per m ) required for full-cost recovery and the average farmer water
3
charge.  Our data (see Table A.9) indicate that, in 1994,  the government recovered
around 0.065 Dh. per m of water used in LSI areas, corresponding to around 28% of the
3 
costs of O&M (Operations and Maintenance, also including energy) and 19% of a more
complete water delivery cost, also including amortization.This calculation assumes that the representative farmer under LSI only differs
16
from the average farmer in the rest of the irrigated areas in that he pays water tariffs.
This lack of response may also be explained as follows: The representative
17
irrigated farmer is entitled to a given water quantity. Given that the value of the last drip
(the marginal value product of water) exceeds the initial unit water tariff (leaving a
positive marginal return to the farmer), the farmer fully uses this water quantity,
allocating it across crops so as to maximize profits. If after a hike, the unit tariff still falls
short of the marginal value product of water, there is no direct production response — the
farmer still maximizes profits by allocating the full quantity across the crops in an
unchanged manner. The only change is that the unit tariff is larger and income is
reallocated from the farmer to the government. In reality, it is likely that these conditions
hold for the average tariff-paying LSI farmer; also after the hikes, he would be left with a
positive marginal return to their water.
18
The content of the water-tariff simulations and their effects are summarized in
Tables 3.2.1-2. In the first simulation, TAR-OM, the government water tariff is raised to
the level of 1994 O&M costs while, in TAR-FC, it covers the full delivery cost. The
repercussions of these two tariff hikes are qualitatively similar. Tariff increases lead to a
decline in average irrigated farmer incomes  (by 4-7%), and an increase in government
savings, with a corresponding decline in household savings as the urban households shift
part of their income from savings to consumption. The decline in the income of the
average irrigated farm household would be limited to farmers in LSI areas; for this group,
the increase in tariffs generates an income cut of 8-14%.
16
Except for the change in irrigated farmer incomes, the repercussions are quite
moderate — the macro significance of increased cost recovery is small. On the micro
level, the total water rent (the marginal value product of water) is not affected; the tariff
increase merely leads to a reallocation of water rent from farmers to government. The fact
that total water consumption is unaffected reflects that,  also after the tariff hike, the tariff
is less than the total rent, leaving a positive residual rent to the farmers whose optimal
water allocation and total water consumption are not affected.  
1720
The indirect effects of the resulting changes in the pattern of incomes and spending
generate a negligible (but unfavorable) impact on GDP growth and sectoral production
volumes, unemployment, and aggregate household income. These changes are driven by
the initial redistribution of water income (from irrigated farmers to the government),
reallocating consumption demand from the commodity bundle demanded by irrigated
farmers (who have less income available for consumption) to the bundle desired by urban
households (who save less and consume more as government savings expand).
While these results provide a reasonable approximation of the major real-world
impact of the proposed tariff hikes, it should be noted that marginal farm-level
adjustments are likely: the higher tariffs would exceed the water rent of some LSI farmers
(in reality water rents are not uniform) who both have the ability and incentive to respond
by using less water and/or reallocating water toward crops with higher marginal water
returns. Significant changes in the pattern of water use would require structural changes
in the system for water allocation (including rules for allocating water across basins).
The absence of an integrated national market for water, by no means unique to
Morocco, leads to inefficient water allocation, manifested in large gaps in marginal water
values between different users. One step toward reducing this inefficiency would involve
giving farmers (both in LSI schemes and other irrigated areas) tradable rights in the water
quantities they customarily consume, providing them with the opportunity of selling
water to urban and other non-agricultural consumers. Both water sales and higher rates of
cost recovery for the irrigation system would be facilitated by farmer participation in
water management via Water Users’ Associations.
The price at which farmers would be able to sell such a water quantity is difficult to
predict; it would fall somewhere between the current marginal return to water received by
the farmers  (around Dh 0.45 in year 2000 according to the model) and the marginal
willingness to pay for urban and municipal users, which may be more than triple this level
(World Bank, 1995, p. 23). To illustrate the range of potential gains, two simulations areThe rationale for the choice of 5% is that, within the time frame of this analysis,
18
such a sales share seemed plausible.
The outcome is influenced by the elasticity of substitution between water and
19
other factors of production, set at 1.05.
The model is not structured to recognize the welfare-enhancement that results
20
from higher non-agricultural water consumption.
21
conducted with the farmers selling 5% of their water.   For the first, TAR-SAL1, the
18
price is set at the minimum level, the marginal water return received by the farmers; for
the second, TAR-SAL2, the price is set at three times this level.
This sales quantity amounts to a cut in agriculture’s water consumption from 85% of total
water use (World Bank, 1995, p. iii) to 80.8%, i.e., a major increase in non-agricultural
consumption (by 28%, from 15% to 19.2% of the total water supply). 
Compared to TAR-OM, these two simulation lead to an increase in the marginal
value of the water that remains in agriculture, a less severe fall in the incomes of the LSI
farmers, a slight decline in government revenue and savings (since the farmers now pay
the water tariff on a smaller quantity), and more widespread (but still small) changes in
the cropping pattern, sufficient to generate the required 5% consumption cut; the
repercussions are stronger for TAR-SAL2, the simulation with the higher sales price for
water.  The impact on real GDP is slightly more negative since one productive sector
19
now has to do with fewer resources.
20
To summarize, the imposition of a higher water tariff has the advantage of
improving the government’s fiscal position. However, they have the drawback of hurting
LSI farmers. Hence, they should only be one of several measures included in a broader
and more positive policy package for rural development. If  the water tariff hike is
combined with the option of selling water, the impact on irrigated farmers is cushioned
while significant quantities of water are diverted for non-agricultural use and the
economy-wide efficiency of water allocation is improved. Such water sales may increaseA comparison between planned area and water expansion shows that the plan
21
aims at unchanged water quantities per land unit.
22
over time as they provide incentives for water-saving technical change, with an important
role for farmer-financed investments. 
3.3. IRRIGATION EXPANSION
Expansion of irrigated areas is an important part of government agricultural
policies. The simulations in this paper are defined on the basis of “Plan National
d’Irrigation” (PNI) for 1993-2000. The projected increase (by 93,400 ha) corresponds to
an 8.9% addition to the existing area under permanent irrigation and a 1.5% loss in the
rainfed area. Detailed information on the PNI is presented in Table A.10. In the
simulations, it is assumed that the land that is transferred from rainfed to irrigated
conditions takes on the characteristics of the average piece of previously irrigated land.
According to the plan, the increase in irrigated area is accompanied by a corresponding
proportional increase in the irrigated water supply, leaving the irrigated farmers with an
unchanged quantity of water per hectare.
21
The plan is simulated first without (IRR-LND) and then with the planned increase
in water (IRR-LW); see Tables 3.3.1-2 for assumptions and results. The first simulation is
motivated by the fact that the mobilization of water cannot be taken for granted since,
among other things, it depends on the amount of rainfall. According to the definitions
used for household categories, the "irrigated farm households" keep an unchanged area of
irrigated land. The "rainfed farm households" end up owning the rainfed land that stays
rainfed as well as the rainfed land that becomes irrigated. The water shares of the two
households correspond to their irrigated land shares.
For these simulations there is initially a change in the supply of two or more factors
(an increase in irrigated land and a decrease in rainfed land for the IRR-LND scenario,The demand for output from the irrigated sector may be defined as the difference
22
between national demand and the supply from rainfed areas. As a result of increased
resource scarcity and downward pressure on output prices when irrigated production
expands,  production in the rainfed areas fall, adding to the increase in demand for
irrigated output.
24
combined with an increase in water in the IRR-LW scenario) that generates
disequilibrium and price changes in the relevant factor markets. As a result, marginal
revenue no longer equals marginal cost in crop activities; the producers respond by
changing their output and factor mix, increasing their production of crops that are
intensive users of water and irrigated land while marginally contracting their production
of crops using rainfed land. These initial responses bring about further changes in
commodity and factor prices, household incomes, exports, imports, and the exchange rate
before a new equilibrium is reached. 
For the first scenario, IRR-LND, the final outcome is a decline in the price (rent) of
irrigated land (its supply increased) combined with price increases for rainfed land
(supply decrease) and water (in unchanged supply but used jointly with the factor in
increased supply). In terms of factor incomes, the combined effects of these price and
quantity changes are increases for water and irrigated land but a small decline for rainfed
land. This result suggests that output demands faced by the irrigated subsector are
sufficiently elastic to absorb additional output without significant price falls while, in the
context of a resource transfer to a competing sector, the increase in the rainfed land rent
falls short of compensating for the decline in supply.  As expected, GDP growth
22
accelerates for irrigated agriculture while rainfed areas produce less. In irrigated
agriculture, increased area shares are allocated to cereals and legumes, a reflection of the
fact that rainfed zones, the total area of which declines, devote large land shares to these
crops. There are insignificant changes in more aggregate indicators — agricultural and
economywide GDP at factor cost, economywide GDP at market prices, the rate of
unemployment, and average household income per capita. 25
On the disaggregated household level, the major effects are lower incomes for the
irrigated farm households (reflecting that the declining return to an unchanged quantity of
irrigated land and the loss in irrigation water overwhelm the effect of a higher water
value) and higher incomes for the rainfed farm households (the total income from the new
resource bundle, including irrigated land and accompanying water, exceeds that of the old
bundle with rainfed land). The rainfed farmers may be disaggregated into two groups,
those who have their land converted to irrigation (occupying 1.5% of the initial rainfed
land area) and those whose land remains rainfed (98.5% of the initial rainfed land area),
assuming that the two groups are identical in all other respects. As expected, behind the
increase in aggregate per-capita incomes by 1.8% lies highly disparate income
improvements for the two groups. For the smaller group, whose land is converted, per-
capita incomes go up by 23.2% whereas the larger group that remains rainfed only enjoys
an increase by 0.8%. The impact on non-farm households is negligible.
For IRR-LW, the land transfer is combined with a water increase. As the economy's
resources have increased, growth on the aggregate and agricultural sector levels is more
rapid, unemployment declines, and average household income increases. Compared to the
outcome for IRR-LND, growth is more rapid for every sector except rainfed agriculture,
for which growth declines marginally. Both new and original irrigated farmers benefit
directly from the increase in water supplies while other groups benefit from general
economic expansion and reduced relative prices of agricultural outputs. All households
see their incomes improve compared to IRR-LND and, with the exception of the original
irrigated farmers, also compared to the BASE. For disaggregated rainfed farmers, the
pattern from the preceding simulation is repeated; the growth rates in per-capita incomes
for the beneficiaries of irrigation expansion and for those who remain dependent on rain
are 24.9% and 0.8%, respectively.For the IRR-LND scenario, without additional water, the simulated net return
23
would be strongly negative.
The unit O&M cost for additional water is the difference between what is charged
24
in the model (0.031 Dh/m3) and the 1994 full O&M cost (0.229 Dh/m3). The economic
O&M cost (more appropriate for cost-benefit analysis) may be lower than this financial
cost to the extent that the financial price of labor exceeds the economic price (likely in a
setting with unemployment).
The sensitivity of results to alternative cost assumptions was also explored. A
25
20% cut in investment costs in each year led to internal rates of return at 12% and 10%
when the cost side included investment costs and both investment and O&M costs,
respectively. The impact of assuming that payments after 2001 (not yet scheduled) are
spread evenly over 2001 and 2002 (instead of being paid in full in 2001, as otherwise
assumed) was negligible; there was no change in the internal rates of return.
26
The impact of irrigation expansion, represented by the IRR-LW scenario, is next
assessed in the framework of benefit-cost analysis.  Table 3.3.3. shows area expansion,
23
costs and benefits. In Table 3.3.4, the corresponding present values are computed and
compared. Two cost alternatives are included, with and without additional O&M costs.  
24
(See bottom of Tables for additional explanations). The benefits of the program are
measured by the increase in economy-wide real factor incomes (nominal factor incomes
deflated by the aggregate CPI), from 294.14 bn. for the BASE scenario to  295.03 bn.,
i.e., by 0.89 bn. (in 1994 prices). Benefits and additional O&M costs appear gradually, in
proportion to the cumulative share of the total area expansion that has taken place, and
disappear gradually during the period 2024-2028 (exactly 30 years after each area/water
expansion, following MAMVA practice).
If only investment costs are included, the net present value (NPV) of the irrigation
expansion program is positive at a maximum discount rate of 9%. If additional O&M
costs are included, the maximum rate falls to 8%, i.e., the precise treatment of O&M costs
has little influence on the result.  Whether irrigation expansion should be undertaken or
25
not does not only depend on how these internal rates of return (8-10%) compare to someIn high-income countries, where TFP growth tends to follow advances in best
26
practice, a typical annual economy-wide TFP growth rate is around 1.5%. In low- and
middle-income countries, where TFP growth reflects stronger elements of catching up or
falling behind,  annual economy-wide growth varies much more widely, between more
28
minimum acceptable economy-wide rate. If agricultural investment funds are limited, the
decision would also influenced by the  returns to competing alternative projects for
agriculture. Moreover, the analysis captures the impact of the investment package during
a non-drought year — there is also a need to consider additional benefits arising from
increased stability of irrigated production and incomes. 
3.4. ACCELERATED PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
Instead of augmenting the factors of the sector, growth in agricultural production
and incomes can be raised by increased productivity of the factors currently available, an
aspect that is explored in the following simulations of accelerated TFP growth. The
simulations are divided into three groups according to the sectors that are targeted: (a) the
entire irrigated and rainfed subsectors; (b) sets of activities (crops or livestock) in both
irrigated and rainfed areas; and (c) aggregate economic sectors (agricultural, rural non-
agricultural, urban, and all sectors in the national economy). In all simulations, it is
assumed that the targeted activities enjoy an increase in annual total factor productivity
(TFP) growth by 1.0% per year, raising TFP growth from -0.4% to 0.6%. For the targeted
activities, this means that, with unchanged factor quantities, the quantity of output goes
up by 1% per year assuming a 1% increase in intermediate inputs (i.e., there is no change
in intermediate input use per unit of output). For agricultural crop activities, this can be
restated as an annual increase in yield by 1% (along with identical productivity increases
for water and labor) combined with an increase in intermediate input use per unit of fixed
land (but unchanged intermediate input use per unit of output). The international record
suggests that productivity growth at this higher level is highly feasible.
26than 3% per year (for some East Asian countries) and -3% (for countries in sub-Saharan
Africa) (World Bank, 1993, pp. 55-56). For the aggregate agricultural sector, the
historical record is quite similar, both in terms of growth rates and differences between
high- and low-income countries (Ball et al, 1996, pp. 39, 50; Pingali and Heisey, 1996,
pp. 56-57, 92-93).
As defined here, a fully open small economy is characterized by infinitely elastic
27
foreign demands and supplies for traded commodities, and perfect substitutability
between commodities that are exported, imported, and produced and sold in the domestic
market.
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Other things being equal, an increase in TFP leads to that marginal revenue exceeds
marginal cost in the targeted sectors. In response, the (profit-maximizing) producers
increase production, bringing about a chain of repercussions affecting the domestic
economy and its interaction with the rest of the world. The distribution of gains from
productivity growth cannot be ascertained a priori in an economy which, as in the case of
Morocco (and our model), is situated between the two textbook extremes of autarchy and
a fully open small economy.  For the case of autarchy, if the demands faced by the
27
targeted sector are inelastic (elastic), productivity gains tend to reduce (increase) the
incomes of the owners of factors used intensely in this sector. In a fully open small
economy, the targeted factors invariably earn higher returns since output prices are not
affected  (cf. Binswanger, 1980, pp. 201-203). For our model, the middle ground of
imperfect integration is captured by the assumption of quality differences between
commodities of different origins (domestic or foreign) and destinations (sold at home or
abroad).
Tables 3.4.1-2 summarize the assumptions and the results for the first group of
simulations. In both simulations, growth increases strongly in the targeted subsector but
remains stagnant in the rest of agriculture. Economywide growth, employment, and
household incomes (both average and disaggregated) rise in rough proportion to the size
of the targeted subsector, i.e., they are much stronger when rainfed agriculture is targeted.
On the household level, the owners of the key resources of the targeted sector (one of the31
two farmer groups) gain the most, while the households whose fortunes are linked to the
competing subsector (the other group of farm households) gain the least. Other
households benefit via the markets for factors and agricultural outputs. However, it
should be noted that, when rainfed agriculture is targeted, the gains of rainfed farmers are
relatively modest and exceeded by those of some of the consumer households; this
reflects that the impact of low elasticities faced by the outputs of the rainfed subsector. 
The next set of simulations explores the impact of accelerated productivity growth
for groups of agricultural activities, all of which are present in both irrigated and rainfed
areas. The simulations and a result summary are found in Tables 3.4.3-4. As expected, the
positive economywide effects are most significant when the large cereals-legumes sector
is targeted. For all cases, the effects are positive according to both macro and micro
indicators, including higher incomes for every household group. Given that household
demands are relatively inelastic for cereals and legumes, farm households do less well
than others in the first simulation.
The final set of simulations compares the effects of productivity growth for the
three aggregate economic sectors — agricultural, rural non-agricultural, and urban
activities — as well as the impact of an economy-wide acceleration of productivity
growth; given that the targeted sectors are larger, such changes tend to be more difficult
to achieve. Data on these simulations are given in Tables 3.4.5-6. The changes in GDP,
employment, and average incomes show that productivity growth is a key to improved
overall living standards. In the last two simulations, when the urban activities (the largest
sector) and the economy as a whole benefit from growth acceleration, the economy
reaches full employment and their is some upward wage movement. 
However, with one exception, the outcome is more favorable for the urban
households than their rural counterparts in general and the farmer households in
particular. Ultimately this reflects that, as an economy grows, those who primarily rely on
immobile factors in sectors of declining importance tend to suffer compared to others.34
The one exception is the simulation PRD-RNAG, where productivity growth accelerates
for the rural non-agricultural sector. Since the outputs of this sector are largely non-
tradable, substantial gains are passed on to the demanders via lower output prices. In this
case, all rural households do better than the urban households. The reason is that, while
the links of the urban households are negligible,  rural households are strongly linked to
the rural non-agricultural sector, both as consumers of final goods and producers
purchasing intermediate inputs. Through both channels,  a fall in the relative prices of this
category of goods raises real agricultural household incomes. Hence, if the goal is to
improve the relative position of rural households, this sector should be targeted. 
3.5. WIN-WIN SCENARIOS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT
The preceding simulations have focused on combining a base scenario (including
partial removal of price-distorting tariffs and taxes) with exogenous changes in one area.
Empirically, it has been shown that, not only are the base-scenario gains for the farm
households modest, some of the additional policies that are under way or may be
implemented (irrigation expansion and higher water tariffs) would, other things being
equal, be detrimental to some or all of today's irrigated farmers. Moreover, for all
simulations except the one with increased accelerated rural non-agricultural productivity
growth, the gap would increase between average incomes in rural and urban areas.
The approach of introducing exogenous changes in one area helps to sort out the
lines of causation. It may, however, divert attention from the fact that successful rural
development, generating broad-based income gains throughout the economy and an
improved relative position for rural people, requires simultaneous progress on several
fronts. Hence, a set of scenarios was formulated to illustrate that such a success can be
brought about by relatively modest improvements along multiple dimensions. To35
illustrate the role of different parts of the strategy, the changes are introduced in a step-
wise manner. 
The assumptions are presented in Table 3.5.1. The starting point is the scenario
with water tariffs fully covering O&M costs (TAR-OM); to facilitate comparisons, this
scenario is repeated in the Tables of this section. In an incremental fashion, the following
scenarios introduce improved penetration of export markets for Morocco's major
agricultural export items, fruits and vegetables (represented by annual growth in foreign-
currency export prices by 1%), rural productivity growth (agricultural and non-
agricultural, the latter at a more rapid pace), accelerated rural productivity growth, and,
finally, sales of agricultural water to urban users.
The results, shown in Table 3.5.2, illustrate that multiple goals can realistically be
accomplished at the same time. In the first scenario, WIN-WIN1, higher export prices for
fruits and vegetables attract resources to agriculture in general, and fruit and vegetable
production in particular. Agricultural output prices and factor incomes increase. Higher
agricultural output prices have a negative impact on other sectors and consumers whereas
higher factor incomes have a positive effect by raising demand for non-agricultural
production. The exchange rate appreciates (to support the trade deficit, fixed in foreign
currency). The end result is that, compared to TAR-OM, rural production increases
(especially for the fruit and vegetable sectors) while urban production declines slightly.
There is no significant change in growth but some decline in unemployment and a minor
increase in aggregate household incomes. Farm households benefit significantly,
especially in irrigated areas. However, in spite of this improvement, per-capita incomes of
households in large-scale irrigation zones remain below the 1994 level. Non-farm
households register relatively minor losses. In sum, the assumed increase in fruit and
vegetable export prices has positive effects, especially for farmers, but are, on their own,
not sufficient to generate a win-win outcome; larger export price increases would benefit
some but not everybody.For example, the annual growth rate for GDP at factor cost increased by 0.44%
28
between WIN-WIN2 and WIN-WIN1; between WIN-WIN3 and WIN-WIN2, the
corresponding increase is 0.40%.
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In WIN-WIN2, rural TFP growth is increased by 0.5% for all agricultural sectors
and by 1% for rural non-agriculture; otherwise this scenario is identical to WIN-WIN1.
Compared to WIN-WIN1, this pattern of productivity growth leads to a strong increase in
aggregate household income, with a  bias in favor of rural households including farmers
in large-scale irrigation who nevertheless remain worse off than in 1994. (The
mechanisms through which TFP growth affects the economy were discussed in Section
3.4.) There are notable increases in production for all sectors and unemployment declines.
Increases in incomes and production raise imports and put downward pressure on exports,
necessitating depreciation to maintain the exogenous trade deficit. When, in WIN-WIN3, 
the rates of productivity growth are doubled for agriculture and rural non-agriculture, the
changes follow the same pattern and are roughly linear.  At this point, all households are
28
better off, also farmers in large-scale irrigation zones.
In the final scenario, all irrigated farmers are permitted to sell 5% of their water at a
price set at three times the water rent received by the farmers when using water in crop
production. The same assumption was made for TAR-SAL2 and the main effects are
similar: there is a strong increase in the incomes of irrigated farm households (by more
than 3%) and some decline in irrigated crop production. Otherwise, the impact is small. If
the model had been structured to capture the benefits of non-agricultural water
consumption, a broad welfare-enhancing effect would have been achieved as water is
moved to areas where its marginal return is higher. 
To conclude,  the last two scenarios demonstrate that a win-win outcome can be
brought about by a combination of modest improvements in selected areas. Aggregate
performance is stronger than for the BASE according to all indicators. Among
agricultural sectors, growth is most rapid for vegetables, fruits and livestock products.38
The rural non-agricultural sectors grow at a slightly faster pace than agriculture.
Improvements in household incomes are widely shared and unemployment declines
significantly. On average, the rural households enjoy more rapid income growth than the
urban households. In spite of the burden of higher water tariffs, the farm households in
LSI zones do significantly better than for the BASE scenario (or compared to 1994). In
addition, the proposed scenario strengthens the government’s fiscal position, provides
significant quantities of water for use elsewhere in the economy, and puts in place an
incentive structure that supports water-saving technical change.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents an economywide model that focuses on the rural economy,
with the agricultural sector disaggregated into irrigated and rainfed areas. An aggregate
representation of the urban economy is included to capture economy-wide interactions.
The model is used to explore issues pertinent to the formulation of a Moroccan rural
development strategy: policies for water tariffs and agricultural water sales, irrigation
expansion, and productivity growth.
According to the BASE scenario, real GDP grows at an annual rate of 3.1%
between 1994 and 2000 and, on average, household per-capita incomes increase by 10%
during the period as a whole. However, a disproportionate part of the gains fall in the
hands of urban households. Hence, there is a need for a rural development strategy aimed
at raising income growth in rural areas.
The results show that, while improving the fiscal position of the government, 
rasing water tariffs sufficiently to recover O&M costs has a strong negative impact on the
incomes of farmers in LSI areas. However, if the option of allowing irrigated farmers to
sell water is introduced, the negative impact of the tariff hike is cushioned while
significant quantities of water are diverted to other uses. In addition to paving the way for39
a more efficient sectoral water allocation, water sales may also encourage water-saving
technical change based on investments financed by the farmers themselves.
The simulated impact of the national irrigation plan (PNI), including an increase in
irrigation water that is proportional to the irrigated land expansion, is positive for all
actors except the original irrigated farm households, who face declining land and water
rents. However, the gains would be highly concentrated in the hands of the farm
households who own the land that is converted to irrigation. Benefit-cost analysis shows
that the internal rate of return of the program is modest, in the range of 8-10%.
The simulations suggest that accelerated productivity growth, both economywide
and sectoral, is Pareto-improving. However, the relative gains are larger for urban
households. The relative incomes for rural households improve only when productivity
growth is targeted to rural non-agricultural sectors. Hence, this is a high-priority area for
productivity-raising efforts along with the rainfed subsector, the targeting of which is
particularly beneficial to the large group of relatively disadvantaged rainfed farmers.
In a final set of simulations, the model is used to explore win-win scenarios that
combine elements of the above simulations — more rapid productivity growth in rural
(agricultural and non-agricultural) activities, higher water tariffs, and water sales — with
improved penetration of export markets for fruits and vegetables. The results demonstrate
that, under realistic assumptions, it is possible to design a policy package and resulting
development path that combine rapid and efficient growth in incomes and production
throughout the economy with an improved relative position for the rural population.40
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MOR.APPENDIX A:  
SUPPLEMENTARY SIMULATION AND MODEL DATAAPPENDIX B:  
A NOTE ON MOROCCAN AGRICULTURAL 
DATA SOURCES DISAGGREGATED BY FARM SIZEB-1
B.1. ACCESSIBLE DATA
B.1. 1. SURVEYS CONDUCTED AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
The 1981/82 Agricultural Survey by Farm Size (DPAE/MAMVA)
This survey, which is based on a national sample, gives the distribution of land and
the cropping pattern by farm size (see Table B.1) but does not give the distribution of
irrigated land, the herds, input use, or production levels.
The minimum size of viability survey (Direction de l'Aménagement Foncier)
This survey covered all DPA zones and gives gross margins (agricultural revenue)
for small and medium farms. Even though it provides valuable data on small farms,
especially revenue levels, this survey has many weaknesses:
C the raw data are not accessible and not centralized;
C the rainfed areas in ORMVAs zones (about 25 % of the cultivated land) are not
covered;
C no distinction is made between irrigated and rainfed land;
C lack of homogeneity in the sampling method, in the timing of the surveys (not
conducted in the same years) and in the computation procedure of farm revenues;
C large farms are not covered and the sizes of small and medium farms are loosely
defined;
C no information are given on the sizes of the herds, inputs uses, nor the level of
productivity by activity.
B.1. 2. SURVEYS WITH SMALLER DOMAINS (NOT NATIONAL)
Many studies were conducted at the regional level (local development projects
preparation) or as part of academic work (see below list of  references). Although these
studies include important information on farms, the raw data used are highly
heterogenous (various approaches, years, sampling methods, areas of interest, etc.)B-2
Table B.1. The 1981/82 Agricultural Survey (DPAE/MAMVA) (ha)
Crops \ Farm size  0-5 5-20 20-50 50-  Total
Cereals 1041385 1882964 698333 526084 4148766
Legumes 66084 137366 43215 24462 271127
Industrial Crops 32347 33732 7549 19187 92815
Oil Crops 28253 16494 4791 5541 55079
Vegetables 34308 36754 10160 18620 99842
Fodder crops 37825 38197 10919 28680 115621
Others Crops 1748 3189 1356 1310 7603
Fruit Trees 159038 173087 52387 97690 482202
Under trees 70626 55002 32532 8173 166333
Fallow 530650 1261235 532883 500440 2825208
Total area 1860750 3530654 1351827 1208692 7951923
Number of farms 921564 358981 46882 12055 1339482In French, these are referred to as “Enquête niveau de vie”.
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B.2. DATA NOT EASILY ACCESSIBLE
B.2.1. THE COST OF PRODUCTION SURVEY (DPAE/MAMVA):
According to available information, the DPAE has conducted four "cost of
production" surveys (in 1984, 1988 and 1992 at the national level, and in 1989 for a
sample of provinces representative of the main bio-climatic systems). These surveys have
the advantage of being representative at the national level and contain the necessary
information for a disaggregation by farm size (inputs uses and outputs). Unfortunately
these surveys were not published and are not accessible.
B.2.2. FARMS BUDGETS AND HOUSEHOLDS LIVING STANDARDS
(DPAE/MAMVA)
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This survey conducted in 1994 includes useful information on factor use (capital
and labor by origin), use of non-factor inputs, output levels, and revenue sources. Data
from this survey are not yet available (or not directly accessible); they are currently being
processed.
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Table 2.1.1. Model disaggregation of activities, factors, other inputs, and institutions
Set Elements
Activities Irrigated* agriculture (17)
    Hard Wheat, Soft Wheat, Barley, Maize, Other Cereal, Legumes, Fodder,    
    Sugarbeet, Sugarcane, Sunflower, Other Industrial Crops, Vegetables,
    Olives, Citrus, Other Fruit, Cow, Sheep-Goat
Rainfed* agriculture (15)
    Hard Wheat, Soft Wheat, Barley, Maize, Other Cereal, Legumes, Fodder,
    Sugarbeet, Sunflower, Other Industrial Crops, Vegetables, Olives, Other
    Fruit, Cow, Sheep-Goat
Other (9)
    Other Animal Production, Rural services, Forestry, Petrol, Electricity,
    Food processing, Sugar Processing, Fertilizers/Chemicals, Public
   Administration, Other Urban. 
Factors of Resources (4)
production    Water, Irrigated Land,* Rainfed Land,* Pasture Land
Labor (2)
   Rural, Urban
Capital (4)
   Crop machinery, Livestock (by animal type & irrigated/rainfed), 
   Other Rural, Urban 
Intermediate Commodities produced by abovementioned activities (including
inputs disaggregated treatment of animal commodities  — manure, fodder products,
etc.)
Institutions Households (5) 
    Irrigated farmer, Rainfed farmer, Rural worker, Other rural, Urban
Government
Rest of the world
*The land is divided into permanently irrigated and other, primarily rainfed, areas. In this
paper, the term "irrigated land" refers to permanently irrigated land, around 1.050 mn ha,
excluding around 250,000 ha of seasonally irrigated land. (Cf. Table A.11). 7
Table 2.3.1. Basic model assumptions
Behavioral Producers: Profit-maximization
objectives Households: Utility maximization
Technology CES function for factors; fixed intermediate input coefficients (except
for food processing inputs and selected inputs to livestock activities, for
which input coefficients are flexible (determined by a CES
formulation).
Market - Commodities: flexible prices equalizing supply and demand; price
clearing wedges generated by government producer & consumer subsidies, and
variables import tariffs. Imperfect substitutability between multiple sources of any
given commodity. 
Resources: Flexible rent (if full utilization); Supplied on demand with
zero rent (if excess supply)
Rural Labor: Full (peak-season) employment; Migration maintains
fixed ratio share of urban wage; 
Urban Labor: Downward urban wage rigidity (if unemployment);
Upwardly flexible urban wage (if full employment)
Capital: Flexible rent and full utilization